Demography

Polling Responses over Time

Polling response rates also affect polling results.  As State Demographer in a rural state (South Dakota), changes in how the Census obtained and disseminated data made us increasingly dependent on the American Community Survey.  It was definitely more current than the decennial census – but the small numbers of participants made it less reliable.  Deborah Griffin, in “Measuring Survey Nonresponse by Race and Ethnicity” concluded: “The data suggest that special efforts are needed to address differential survey response rates – to increase the rates for areas with high concentrations of AIANs, Blacks and Hispanics . . . New methods to address low mail response must be developed.”

On February 27, 2019, PEW published “Response rates in telephone surveys have resumed their decline.”  The critical part of the article is shown in the graph below – in 1997, the response rate was 36%, twenty years later it was 6%.  Kind of makes polling more difficult – particularly when you project the decline down to 2020.

On 10/26, PEW published “What the 2020 electorate looks like by party, race and ethnicity, age, education and religion” and said, “Around a third of registered voters in the U.S. (34%) identify as independents, while 33% identify as Democrats and 29% identify as Republicans, according to a Center analysis of Americans’ partisan identification based on surveys of more than 12,000 registered voters in 2018 and 2019.”   Contrast that with Gallup’s findings.

In 2013, the Research Council of Norway published, “Fewer Willing to Participate in Surveys.”  The most relevant observation to political polling is “In general, NSD sees that young, single men living in urban areas are the least likely to respond, while older women are the most willing.” 

Polling accuracy depends on random selection.  As the proportion of respondents becomes smaller, the quality of randomness declines.  Causation is not proven by correlation, it must be inferred.  My inference is that the middle has stopped responding to polls – pollsters are getting responses from the same ideologically extreme friends who post political memes, and not from the center.  When 94% of those surveyed do not respond, we’re looking at some extreme nonresponse bias.

Demography

Party Affiliation over Time

It seems, especially in the midst of an election year that the political parties are long established and permanent. While we don’t have an especially high rate of turnover in major political parties we do have one.

The Republicans became the Democratic Republicans, which eventually become the Democrats (an extremely brief summary of a rather lengthy chunk of American History). The Republican party, as we know it today, actually came out of the Whig party (well, a splinter faction, sort of. No one said politics was straight forward).

At any rate, political parties are not constant and neither is their membership. Gallup has a nice collection of data on party affiliation that we referenced last week in things that make surveys hard. Since they’ve provided it as a table, here is the graph:

Party Affiliation over time; data from Gallup

Looking at Gallup’s data, we can make several observations. Since 2004, the general trend has been an increase in people identifying as Independents, and a decrease in both Republicans and Democrats. We also notice that declines in either major party tend to coincide with increases in Independents.

The top of the graph is 50%, and while none of our three categories make it that high, Independents come the closest (highest percent independents was 47%, which occurred both in October of 2013 and October of 2014).

A “Zoomed in” version of the previous graph, from 2012 on

Taking a closer look at things (note that I’ve changed the vertical scale as well, the bottom is now 15%) from 2012 on, we can see a large drop in both Republicans and Democrats in 2013 that has a corresponding rise in independents. 2018 had a decline in Independents that mirrors a rise in Democrats.

The difficulty with examining trends is “How far do we have to zoom out?” Over a large amount of time, it’s difficult to see the impacts of smaller events but easier to examine long term trends. Another consideration is that what looks like a clear trend on the small scale may not reflect the trend in the long term.

Political polling doesn’t give us all that much long term data. Do we have enough to make predictions from? Well, the people making predictions certainly seem to think so!

Demography

Things that make Surveys Hard

I was asked to describe the problems with political polls. It is a great year for showing the problems in predicting from opinion polls. Projecting isn’t the problem – we take partial duration series (like flood data) and project the likelihood of larger and smaller events occurring. In my 70 years on the planet, I’ve seen a couple of hundred-year floods on the same river – and it isn’t a big deal. When you project a hundred-year occurrence from 38 years of data, it is a question of how wrong you’re going to be. Poker odds are easy – there are only 52 cards (unless you play with a joker). A pair of dice have only 12 potential combinations. The potential combinations of weather and climate during our planet’s existence aren’t quite infinite, but they approach it.

In January, 2016, Gallup announced that “Democratic, Republican Identification Near Historical Lows”, and explained that 26% identified as Republicans, 29% as Democrats. On January 16, 2020 30% identified as Republican, 27% as Democrats. Gallup’s most recent stats were on September 14, with 28% identifying as Republican and 27% Democrats. If I start with a good model based on the 2016 election results, I have a problem in 2020.

For political polls, our universe consists of registered voters – but that gets to be a problem: “The Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) found that 244 counties across the United States exceed 100% voter registration. Counties in 28 states plus the District of Columbia and Alaska have more voters registered than adults living in those jurisdictions.

After a review of records submitted to the federal government, The Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) discovered 244 counties in which voter registration levels exceed the number of living adults in the jurisdiction. Additionally, 279 counties have registration rates ranging from 95%-99%, which PILF determines are “implausibly high.”

Polling is based on “best available data.” It is a coincidence that the initials are BAD. Starting from poor data makes it hard to develop a way to project with accuracy, and it’s hard enough anyway.

California has more immigrants than any other state – in 2017, 27% of California’s residents were foreign born – and a little over half of them are US citizens. About one of eight contacts is a non-citizen and not eligible to vote. If you survey Montana, 2% of the residents are immigrants, and 58% of those are naturalized citizens. Less than 1 percent of Montana residents aren’t citizens. Few calls reach non-voters. It isn’t easy to develop a national model that projects surveys accurately.

And then there are the folks who lie to pollsters – in 2012, polls in South Dakota had shown strong support for legislation that would limit abortion access – but the vote turned out the other way. It was the first time I encountered what is now called “the shy Trump voter.” When you think about it, it isn’t particularly rational to believe the guy who calls you and interrupts dinner has your privacy as a main concern. On that issue, it looks like 3% or more of the survey respondents weren’t truthful. Face it, there was more than a zero chance that the voice on the other end of the phone might report your comments back to your Aunt Sally!

I am glad I never had to make a living polling and predicting elections. It’s easy to look at the data and predict Trump will carry Montana and Biden will carry California. It’s a bit more risky to project Florida, or North Carolina, or Ohio.